Paola de la Torre, executive president of GuateÍntegra and general director of Ecompliance Consulting, explains in the extract of this interview aspects of the new anti-money laundering law and the possible effects for the population.
The Comprehensive Law for the Prevention and Repression of Money Laundering or Other Assets and the Financing of Terrorism was approved with decree 15-2026 in the Congress of the Republic, and its sanction process has yet to be finalized, promulgated, published and put into effect.
In the second paragraph of article 1, it is established that this law is not intended to attack or repress the informal economy, criminalize the use of cash or be used for tax purposes,
The expert on the subject comments on some scopes, and states that it is not about controlling all the cash, but rather identifying patterns that indicate operations aimed at hiding illicit origin, among other provisions.
The law approved in Congress expressly establishes that it does not seek to criminalize the informal economy or the use of cash. Do you consider that this guarantee is sufficient to avoid abusive interpretations?
Regulatory guarantee is necessary and important, but not sufficient on its own. That the law expressly says so matters, a lot, because it establishes the legal parameter against which any abusive application can be challenged. But compliance experience teaches us that laws are only as good as their implementation. What is needed, and where the real work begins now, is for system operators, supervisors and compliance officers to know precisely what the law is intended to do and what it does not.
The risk-based approach introduced, mainly, by decree 15-2026 is key here: It is not about controlling all the cash, but rather identifying patterns that indicate operations aimed at hiding illicit origin.
What implications does it have for market vendors, farmers or informal workers who conduct most of their transactions in cash?
In direct terms: the law does not persecute them. The focus of the rule is on the obligated persons: banks, exchange houses, notaries, accountants and certain sectors of high-value commerce, who are those who have the obligation to report suspicious transactions.
A market seller who charges in cash is not a subject of suspicion for the simple fact of using cash.
a farmer of Huehuetenango who sells his harvest and receives cash is not an obligated person under this law, and his cash does not activate any reporting mechanism simply because it is cash.
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What does change, and this must be said clearly, is that, to the extent that these people access formal financial services, they may encounter more robust due diligence processes when opening accounts or carrying out certain procedures. That’s not persecution: it’s the cost of having a safer financial system for everyone. The difference between controlling the origin of illicit money and criminalizing poverty or informality is enormous, and the law draws that line. We must ensure, as a country, that we protect that essence of the law.
Is there a risk that, during the enforcement of the law, some individuals or small businesses will face increased financial reporting requirements?
It is a risk that exists, and it would be unserious to deny it. Any more robust compliance system brings with it a greater burden of due diligence on the financial system. What determines whether that becomes an unfair barrier or a reasonable protection is the risk-based approach: The requirements must be proportional to the risk profile of the client and the operation, not applied indiscriminately to everyone who uses the system. This is the challenge for organizations and those in charge of the correct implementation of the essence of the law.
The scenario that we must avoid is that of excessively cautious banks that, for fear of sanctions, apply intensified due diligence measures to everyone equally. That does generate financial exclusion.
Therefore, the correct implementation of the law, with clear secondary regulation and effective supervision, is as important as the law itself. That is where the work of the National Council for the Coordination of Anti-Money Laundering Efforts (CONCLAFT), the Superintendence of Banks (SIB) and the Special Verification Intendancy (IVE) is essential in the coming months.
How is this regulation different from tax measures or tax inspection?
It is a distinction that I think is essential to clarify, because there is a lot of confusion around this. This law is not a tax collection tool nor does it pursue tax evasion. They are completely different regimes, with different objectives, authorities and procedures.
The anti-money laundering law seeks to identify and prevent the proceeds of criminal activities from —for example: drug trafficking, extortion, corruption, human trafficking, weapons, etc.—enter the economic system as if it were legitimate money.
The SAT, on the other hand, has jurisdiction over tax obligations of people and companies, regardless of the origin of their resources.
They are worlds that sometimes intersect, but conceptually and legally they are different. Confusing them creates unnecessary panic.
What mechanisms should exist to guarantee that the law does not end up affecting sectors that are not linked to illicit activities?
There are three pillars that I consider essential.
- First, clear and timely secondary regulation: the law is the framework, but it is the regulations and provisions of the SIB, CONCLAFT and the IVE that translate these obligations into precise operational instructions for each sector. Without that, there is excessive discretion and room for abuse.
- Second, real training for system operators, not only compliance officers of financial entities and obligated persons in general, but also public institutions that will apply the law.
- And third, accessible challenge mechanisms: any person or business that feels they are being subjected to abusive application must have clear and rapid avenues to challenge it.
But there is something equally important as the formal mechanisms, and it is the culture with which the regulator approaches those obliged to do so.
Those who have promoted the law affirm that keeping Guatemala off the gray list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) will benefit the population. What specific effects could an ordinary citizen perceive in their daily life?
More (effects) than you imagine and in everyday things. Remittances are the most immediate example: estimates from the organized private sector projected that the cost of sending could increase by up to 40% if Guatemala had fallen on the gray list, not because someone decides so, but because that is how the international financial market reacts to a country under reinforced monitoring.
And, on the contrary, inclusion in the gray list would have immediate effects on banking correspondents, letters of credit and interest rates. That means that, when someone goes to apply for a loan for their home, business or vehicle, they pay that cost in the interest rate they are charged.
Another effect is that by making it more difficult (and hopefully impossible) to launder money in Guatemala, a clear message is sent to criminal structures that this is not a comfortable country to operate in. When laundering becomes expensive and risky, it also discourages the crimes that generate that illicit money in the first place. This has a direct impact on the safety of communities. It is not just a financial law: it is a law of citizen coexistence. This perspective is general and long-term.
Regarding the attraction of investment and job creation, when a country has a reputation for a weak anti-money laundering system, legitimate money simply looks for another destination. And with it go formal jobs, the productive chain and the generation of value for Guatemalan families.